Campaign Compromises Optimizely Platform to Distribute Malicious JavaScript to Target Retail, Travel Entities

Executive Summary

An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation’s account signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into web projects associated with 178 major organizations on 16 November 2026. Impacted organizations include large multinational firms in multiple industries, including retail, e-commerce, and hospitality. As such, RH-ISAC Core Members are advised to maintain situational awareness around the threat and to take appropriate defensive measures based on the intelligence below.

The compromised scripts, detailed in a StepSecurity report released on 17 November 2026, were distributed through Optimizely’s CDN, allowing malicious code to execute within affected websites and target visitors without requiring changes to the sites’ underlying source code.

The payload combined cryptocurrency address replacement, payment-card skimming, cookie and screenshot exfiltration, and iOS-specific delivery of the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Optimizely confirmed the incident on 17 November, stating that it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected accounts, and implemented additional protections against unauthorized code delivery. Although the primary payload server has since been taken offline, affected organizations should investigate activity from approximately 04:00 to 21:00 UTC on 16 November because multiple loader variants could evade simple indicator-based searches.

Key Takeaways

  • Researchers identified malicious code in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets examined, representing projects associated with 178 organizations across technology, retail, media, travel, and other sectors. The attacker inserted the loader into the Project JavaScript field, causing the legitimate CDN to distribute attacker-controlled code under Optimizely’s legitimate certificate.
  • At least three loader variants were observed: one directly loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js, another concealed the URL using Base64 and atob(), and a third embedded the payload and could execute it using eval() if the external domain was blocked. The payload reportedly underwent 26 builds during 16 November, complicating detection based solely on individual file hashes.
  • The payload could manipulate cryptocurrency addresses across webpage content, clipboard operations, forms, fetch, and XHR traffic; capture payment-card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs; and exfiltrate accessible cookies and screenshots. iPhone and iPad visitors could also receive secondary exploit chains associated with Coruna and DarkSword, extending the campaign beyond browser-based financial theft.
  • Organizations using Optimizely Web should inspect the Project JavaScript field across all projects, review users and API tokens, and examine DNS, proxy, CSP, and browser telemetry beginning at 04:00 UTC on November 16. Hunting should include 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, associated .icu infrastructure, Base64-decoded loaders, unexpected atob() or eval() execution, and affected scripts hosted through either Optimizely’s CDN or customer-controlled domains.

Indicators of Compromise

StepSecurity has released a collection of indicators associated with the campaign, which are included below of RH-ISAC Core Member awareness:

Type

Indicator

Notes

Domain

1688360[.]cc

Payload and exfiltration host. Registered November 16 at 05:23:08 UTC. On registry hold since November 17 at 00:37 UTC and no longer resolves.

Domain

webshell[.]lol (/get.js)

Injector Helme ties to the same actor. First seen September 17. Loaded from a BBC snippet from 04:21 UTC on November 16 (Helme). Not verified by us.

URL paths

/track.js, /html2canvas.min.js, /hit.php, /card.php

Loader target, screenshot library, cookie and screenshot exfiltration, card exfiltration (our analysis).

Loader variants

Script tag for 1688360[.]cc/track.js in projectJS; the same URL in base64 decoded with atob(); a full inline copy of the payload with an eval fallback

Found in the Project JavaScript field of customer projects (Helme).

IP address

136.113.106.136

Last A record for 1688360[.]cc. Google Cloud, us-central1.

SSH host key

5e:7a:7f:b3:d7:22:ba:c7:f5:04:5a:b2:5c:0d:8a:73

ed25519 fingerprint Shodan recorded on 136.113.106.136 on November 5. Useful for finding sibling servers.

Domains (iOS stage)

eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu

Registered November 16 at 16:38:42 UTC. Resolved to 34.87.36.58. No address returned as of 07:30 UTC on November 17.

Domains (iOS stage)

5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu

Registered November 9 at 17:52:42 UTC. Both still resolve to 34.96.213.201. The second has the TXT record ppck-ver=eaf775e3f8fa03179b5761fa5cca1ecb.

Domains (iOS stage)

l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu

The first was registered October 28. The second, listed by Helme, was registered November 16 at 23:44:57 UTC, after he listed it. Both sit behind Cloudflare.

IP addresses

34.87.36.58, 34.96.213.201

Google Cloud in Singapore and Hong Kong. Host the .icu domains above.

URL paths (iOS stage)

/boot.js, /JIUJIU888/weifile.html, /JIUJIU888/index.js, /A8/a.html

Seen in the payload and in public scans of the .icu hosts. The data-channel-code value is 02111110.

File hashes (track.js)

617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40

The first is urlscan’s first capture (28 KB). The second is the final version, live from 17:56 UTC and also in the Amirul Cyber write-up. Helme counts 26 builds on November 16.

Browser artifacts

window._k7, window._cc, window._qxc, window._shot; sessionStorage keys starting cc_; non-native Function.prototype.call and apply

Left in the page by the payload (our analysis).

Network behavior

POST of type text/plain to /hit.php; beacon to /card.php with fields n, e, c, u

Exfiltration requests (our analysis).

Wallets

ETH 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
TRX THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
TON UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
BCH qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5

Replacement addresses hard-coded in track.js. They match the list in the Amirul Cyber write-up. The BTC, LTC and ETH addresses were emptied on November 17.



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