Executive Summary
An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation’s account signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into web projects associated with 178 major organizations on 16 November 2026. Impacted organizations include large multinational firms in multiple industries, including retail, e-commerce, and hospitality. As such, RH-ISAC Core Members are advised to maintain situational awareness around the threat and to take appropriate defensive measures based on the intelligence below.
The compromised scripts, detailed in a StepSecurity report released on 17 November 2026, were distributed through Optimizely’s CDN, allowing malicious code to execute within affected websites and target visitors without requiring changes to the sites’ underlying source code.
The payload combined cryptocurrency address replacement, payment-card skimming, cookie and screenshot exfiltration, and iOS-specific delivery of the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Optimizely confirmed the incident on 17 November, stating that it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected accounts, and implemented additional protections against unauthorized code delivery. Although the primary payload server has since been taken offline, affected organizations should investigate activity from approximately 04:00 to 21:00 UTC on 16 November because multiple loader variants could evade simple indicator-based searches.
Key Takeaways
- Researchers identified malicious code in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets examined, representing projects associated with 178 organizations across technology, retail, media, travel, and other sectors. The attacker inserted the loader into the Project JavaScript field, causing the legitimate CDN to distribute attacker-controlled code under Optimizely’s legitimate certificate.
- At least three loader variants were observed: one directly loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js, another concealed the URL using Base64 and atob(), and a third embedded the payload and could execute it using eval() if the external domain was blocked. The payload reportedly underwent 26 builds during 16 November, complicating detection based solely on individual file hashes.
- The payload could manipulate cryptocurrency addresses across webpage content, clipboard operations, forms, fetch, and XHR traffic; capture payment-card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs; and exfiltrate accessible cookies and screenshots. iPhone and iPad visitors could also receive secondary exploit chains associated with Coruna and DarkSword, extending the campaign beyond browser-based financial theft.
- Organizations using Optimizely Web should inspect the Project JavaScript field across all projects, review users and API tokens, and examine DNS, proxy, CSP, and browser telemetry beginning at 04:00 UTC on November 16. Hunting should include 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, associated .icu infrastructure, Base64-decoded loaders, unexpected atob() or eval() execution, and affected scripts hosted through either Optimizely’s CDN or customer-controlled domains.
Indicators of Compromise
StepSecurity has released a collection of indicators associated with the campaign, which are included below of RH-ISAC Core Member awareness:
Type |
Indicator |
Notes |
Domain |
1688360[.]cc |
Payload and exfiltration host. Registered November 16 at 05:23:08 UTC. On registry hold since November 17 at 00:37 UTC and no longer resolves. |
Domain |
webshell[.]lol (/get.js) |
Injector Helme ties to the same actor. First seen September 17. Loaded from a BBC snippet from 04:21 UTC on November 16 (Helme). Not verified by us. |
URL paths |
/track.js, /html2canvas.min.js, /hit.php, /card.php |
Loader target, screenshot library, cookie and screenshot exfiltration, card exfiltration (our analysis). |
Loader variants |
Script tag for 1688360[.]cc/track.js in projectJS; the same URL in base64 decoded with atob(); a full inline copy of the payload with an eval fallback |
Found in the Project JavaScript field of customer projects (Helme). |
IP address |
136.113.106.136 |
Last A record for 1688360[.]cc. Google Cloud, us-central1. |
SSH host key |
5e:7a:7f:b3:d7:22:ba:c7:f5:04:5a:b2:5c:0d:8a:73 |
ed25519 fingerprint Shodan recorded on 136.113.106.136 on November 5. Useful for finding sibling servers. |
Domains (iOS stage) |
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu |
Registered November 16 at 16:38:42 UTC. Resolved to 34.87.36.58. No address returned as of 07:30 UTC on November 17. |
Domains (iOS stage) |
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu |
Registered November 9 at 17:52:42 UTC. Both still resolve to 34.96.213.201. The second has the TXT record ppck-ver=eaf775e3f8fa03179b5761fa5cca1ecb. |
Domains (iOS stage) |
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu |
The first was registered October 28. The second, listed by Helme, was registered November 16 at 23:44:57 UTC, after he listed it. Both sit behind Cloudflare. |
IP addresses |
34.87.36.58, 34.96.213.201 |
Google Cloud in Singapore and Hong Kong. Host the .icu domains above. |
URL paths (iOS stage) |
/boot.js, /JIUJIU888/weifile.html, /JIUJIU888/index.js, /A8/a.html |
Seen in the payload and in public scans of the .icu hosts. The data-channel-code value is 02111110. |
File hashes (track.js) |
617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3 |
The first is urlscan’s first capture (28 KB). The second is the final version, live from 17:56 UTC and also in the Amirul Cyber write-up. Helme counts 26 builds on November 16. |
Browser artifacts |
window._k7, window._cc, window._qxc, window._shot; sessionStorage keys starting cc_; non-native Function.prototype.call and apply |
Left in the page by the payload (our analysis). |
Network behavior |
POST of type text/plain to /hit.php; beacon to /card.php with fields n, e, c, u |
Exfiltration requests (our analysis). |
Wallets |
ETH 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e |
Replacement addresses hard-coded in track.js. They match the list in the Amirul Cyber write-up. The BTC, LTC and ETH addresses were emptied on November 17. |