Microsoft Warns of Active Exploitation of SharePoint via ToolShell Zero-Day

sharepoint

Executive Summary

Microsoft has identified widespread, active exploitation of a new SharePoint remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability chain, designated ToolShell, tracked as CVE-2025-53770. This zero-day exploit, demonstrated publicly on X just days prior, allows unauthenticated attackers to compromise on-premises SharePoint servers globally, extracting cryptographic secrets and enabling full remote control. Microsoft, and CISA, has confirmed the active exploitation and assigned the CVE, and a patch is currently available for affected versions. Organizations are strongly urged to implement interim mitigations and conduct immediate compromise assessments to defend against ToolShell.

Retail and Hospitality Community Impact 

The retail and hospitality sectors heavily rely on SharePoint for internal collaboration, document management, and potentially even customer-facing portals. A successful exploitation of CVE-2025-53770 could lead to complete compromise of critical internal data, intellectual property theft, and disruption of operational workflows. As such, it is highly recommended that affected organizations apply the relevant patch from Microsoft at the earliest opportunity.

Technical Analysis

The ToolShell (CVE-2025-53770) vulnerability represents a critical unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) chain for on-premises SharePoint servers, originating from a combination of prior Pwn2Own Berlin exploits (CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704). The attack bypasses authentication by leveraging a specific HTTP Referrer header (/_layouts/SignOut.aspx) during a POST request to /_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx, which was publicly fuzzed just before active exploitation began. Once access is gained, the exploit drops a crafted .aspx payload designed specifically to extract the SharePoint server’s MachineKey configuration, including the critical ValidationKey. This ValidationKey is then used with tools like ysoserial to craft fully valid, signed __VIEWSTATE payloads, enabling arbitrary command execution on the server without requiring any administrative credentials.

Indicators of Compromise

Eye Security has publicly provided the following indicators of compromise, which are recommended for earliest available ingestion into your security environment.

Indicator

Description (Context provided by Eye Security)

107.191.58[.]76

first exploit wave US-based source IP responsible for active exploitation on 18th of July around 18:06 UTC deploying spinstall0.aspx

104.238.159[.]149

second exploit wave US-based source IP responsible for active exploitation on 19th of July around 07:28 UTC

96.9.125[.]147

shared by PaloAlto Unit42, we don’t have context

103.186.30[.]186

shared on X by @andrewdanis , we don’t have context

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:120.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/120.0

user agent string used in active exploitation on 18th & 19th of July

Mozilla/5.0+(Windows+NT+10.0;+Win64;+x64;+rv:120.0)+Gecko/20100101+Firefox/120.0

URL-encoded user agent string for IIS log searches

/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit&a=/ToolPane.aspx

POST path used to trigger exploit and push Sharpyshell related to CVE-2025-49706 and/or CVE-2025-53770

Referer: /_layouts/SignOut.aspx

exact HTTP header used in exploiting ToolPane.aspx inside POST request related to CVE-2025-53770

GET request to malicious ASPX file in /_layouts/15/spinstall0.aspx

aspx crypto dumper used by CVE-2021-28474 with tool ysoserial to get RCE on SharePoint

92bb4ddb98eeaf11fc15bb32e71d0a63256a0ed826a03ba293ce3a8bf057a514

SHA256 hash of spinstall0.aspx crypto dumper probably created with Sharpyshell

C:\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\WEBSER~1\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\spinstall0[.]aspx

location of the malicious aspx file on Windows Servers running SharePoint


Unit42 has provided the following indicators of compromise, which are recommended for earliest available ingestion into your security environment.

Indicator

Description (Context provided by Unit42)

4a02a72aedc3356d8cb38f01f0e0b9f26ddc5ccb7c0f04a561337cf24aa84030

initial hash observed

b39c14becb62aeb55df7fd55c814afbb0d659687d947d917512fe67973100b70

 

fa3a74a6c015c801f5341c02be2cbdfb301c6ed60633d49fc0bc723617741af7 

targeting the view state

 

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